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Recent Cases Affecting the Role of the ADEA in
Protecting Older Workers
INTRODUCTION
In 1967 Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act ("ADEA) prohibiting discrimination based on age in hiring and
employment decisions.1 The ADEA originally protected workers
between the ages of forty and sixty-five.2 It now covers all workers
over the age of forty.3 The law was intended to counteract the
effect of harmful negative stereotypes about older workers and has
been characterized as "part of an ongoing congressional effort to
eradicate discrimination in the workplace."4  Several recent
developments have the potential to affect the continuing
effectiveness of the ADEA:s protection of older workers. This
comment examines some recent cases and trends involving the
ADEA.
The ADEA is increasingly important to our society because of
the rapid growth of the older population in recent years, a pattern
that will continue for several decades. The twentieth century saw a
dramatic increase in the number and percentage of older
individuals in the United States. The number of people over the age
of sixty-five increased from 3,080,000 in 1900 to about 34,710,000 in
2000 and is expected to reach 47,804,000 by 2020.5 The percentage
of older individuals in proportion to the overall population
increased from 4.1% in 1900 to about 12.7% in 2000, and it is
1. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994). The ADEA reads in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for an employer... (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of
employment because of such individual's age; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's age.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994).
2. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 232 (1983).
3. The ADEA's coverage was extended up to the age of 70 in 1978. See Wyoming, 460
U.S. at 232. The upper age limit was removed in 1986 and the ADEA now covers all workers
age 40 and older. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 456 (1991).
4. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995).
5. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISnCAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1999, 869 (119TH
EDITION 1999).
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projected to be 18.5% by 2025.6 Due to a number of factors,
including a decreased birthrate and increased longevity, there are
fewer younger workers to support programs such as Medicare and
Social Security that benefit older people. This will make payroll
taxes contributed by older workers a key source of revenue for
such programs. Employers will also have to rely more and more on
older workers. The ADEA will play an important role in shaping
our society in the coming decades because of the growing number
of older workers needing its protection and because of that group's
increasingly important role in the national economy.
The ADEA is not unlimited in scope. The mere fact that a worker
who is forty or older is fired or demoted is not enough to support
an ADEA claim.7 The law expressly allows for firing or disciplining
"for good cause."8 Employers have no duty to retain or offer special
treatment to workers covered by the ADEA. The law also contains
two exceptions, the "reasonable factors other than age" exception
and the "bona fide occupational qualification" exception. 10
The reasonable factors other than age exception allows an
employer to take actions negatively affecting an older worker when
the motivating factor is not the employee's age.' The ADEA does
not prohibit an employer from acting out of concern for excessive
costs, even if the costs are related to seniority or other factors that
tend to be correlated with age. 2 An employer can also refuse to
hire an applicant deemed to be overqualified, another characteristic
that is often correlated with age, without violating the ADEA.1
3
The bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") exception to
the ADEA allows discrimination based on age in certain
circumstances. 14 By allowing overt discrimination based on age, this
exception had the potential to greatly decrease the effectiveness of
the ADEA. However, courts recognized that the BFOQ exception
6. Id. The total number and percentage of all individuals over the age of forty will
also increase, though not as dramatically as the increase in the sixty-five and older group. Id.
7. See Skagen v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 910 F2d 1498 (7th Cir. 1990).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(3) (1998).
9. See Berry v. GMC, 56 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 1995).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1998).
11. See id. The ADEA states in part, "[i]t shall not be unlawful for an employer... to
take action otherwise prohibited... where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors
other than age." Id.
12. See Woroski v. Nashua, 31 F3d 105, 110 (2nd Cir. 1994).
13. See EEOC v. Ins. Co. of North America, 49 E3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1995).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1998). The statute states, "[i]t shall not be unlawful for an
employer to take any action otherwise prohibited... where age is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business." Id.
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was intended to be a very narrow one.15 In Western Airlines v.
Criswell'6 the Supreme Court confirmed this view.' 7 The court
adopted a two part standard previously used by circuit courts in
BFOQ cases.'8 First, the job qualification necessitating an age
requirement must be "reasonably necessary to the essence of the
business."19 While requirements based on safety concerns might
meet this standard, restrictions that are for purposes that are
peripheral to the nature of the business will not meet the
standard.20 As an example, the court cited a case involving Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 196421 wherein an airline's concern about
the "cosmetic effect" of female flight attendants on passengers did
not justify sex discrimination.22 Second, it is not enough that an age
requirement is a convenient or even a reasonable way to ensure
that workers meet the qualification.23 To be a valid BFOQ, an age
requirement must be "reasonably necessary" to the business
involved, a situation that exists only when an employer is
compelled to use age as a proxy for the qualifications established
in the first part of the test.24 There are two ways for an employer
to make this showing.25 The employer can present a factual basis
for a reasonable belief that substantially all persons over a certain
age cannot perform the job in question safely and efficiently.26 The
second way of meeting this part of the test would be for the
employer to prove that it is impossible, or at least very impractical,
to individually evaluate employees or job applicants.27 The court in
Western rejected the employer's attempt to replace the requirement
that a BFOQ be "reasonably necessary" to the operation of the
business with a lower rational basis standard that would be easier
15. See Mahoney v. Trabucco, 574 F Supp 955, 963 (D. Mass. 1983).
16. 472 U.S. 400 (1989).
17. See Western Airlines, 472 U.S. at 412. The Court confirmed the narrow construction
of the BFOQ exception that had been previously set forth in EEOC regulations. See 29 CFR
§1625.6 (1984). Id.
18. See Western Airlines, 472 U.S. at 413, 416-17.
19. See id. at 413.
20. See id.
21. 42 U.S.C. 2000(e) (1994). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was used as a model for the
language in the ADEA and courts often look to cases involving it when deciding cases
involving the ADEA. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
22. See Diaz v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 442 F2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert denied, 404 U.S.
950.







for employers to meet.28
Through its decision in Western the Supreme Court ensured that
the BFOQ exception would continue to be interpreted narrowly and
not in a broad manner that could undermine the purposes of the
ADEA. More recently, the ADEA's scope has been limited and
expanded by decisions involving the issues of the constitutionality
of the ADEA as applied to the states, the burden of proof, and the
availability of disparate impact claims under the ADEA.
I. APPLICATION OF THE ADEA TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES: KIMEL V. FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS
On January 11, 2000, the Supreme Court decided a case with
major ramifications for the coverage of the ADEA, Kimel v. Forida
Board of Regents. 29 The Court decided that the Eleventh
Amendment prohibits Congress from empowering state employees
to sue their employers under the ADEA.3° Although Congress had
attempted to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suits by their own citizens with the ADEA, the Court held it
could not do so constitutionally.
31
Originally the ADEA did not cover government employees at any
level.32 In 1974 an amendment extended the coverage of the Act to
employees of state and local governments as well as the federal
government.3 A 1983 Supreme Court case, EEOC v. Wyoming,3
determined that the act's extension to the states did not violate the
Tenth Amendment.3 5 Previous district court decisions had upheld
the extension as a valid exercise of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause or section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 36 The
district court in Wyoming dismissed the plaintiff's suit against the
State of Wyoming holding that the application of the ADEA to the
states violated the Tenth Amendment.37 Following the trial court's
28. See Western, 472 U.S. at 422. The court noted that if a rational basis standard were
used, the presentation by an expert witness of any plausible reason for the age
discrimination could lead to an employer winning a jury verdict. See id. at 423.
29. 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
30. See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 640, 650.
31. See id. at 650.
32. See id. at 637.
33. See id.
34. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
35. See Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 237, 239.
36. See id. at 234.
37. See id. The district court based its decision on the Supreme Court's holding in Nat'l
League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976). In that case the Supreme Court found
Congress's attempt to extend certain provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state
440 Vol. 39:437
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decision, at least two other district courts found that the extension
of the ADEA to the states was unconstitutional.3 The Supreme
Court disagreed with the trial court, finding that the ADEA as
applied to the states did not violate the Tenth Amendment because
it did not directly impair the states in structuring "integral
operations in areas of traditional government functions. "39 The
Court held that the amendment of the ADEA extending the Act's
coverage to state and local governments was a valid exercise of
Congress's Commerce Clause powers, but found it unnecessary to
decide whether it could also be upheld under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
40
In Kimel the employer based its challenge to the ADEA's
application to the states on the Eleventh Amendment rather than
the Tenth Amendment. 41 The court held that while Congress did
evince its intent to abrogate the states' immunity from suit under
the Eleventh Amendment, doing so exceeded the authority granted
to Congress by section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 42 The
Court reiterated the proposition that the Constitution does not
grant federal courts jurisdiction over suits against states without
the consent of the states involved.43 Justice O'Connor, writing for
the majority, reasoned that if the ADEA was based solely on the
Commerce Clause, then the plaintiffs could not maintain their cases
because of the Eleventh Amendment's modification of the
Commerce Clause powers of Congress. 4  It was, therefore,
necessary for the Court to consider whether the ADEA could be
based on powers granted to Congress by section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, an issue that had not been reached in
EEOC v. Wyoming.
45
governments to be unconstitutional due to a limitation placed on the Commerce Clause by
the Tenth Amendment. See Nat'l League of Cities, 96 S. Ct. 2465. The court viewed the Tenth
Amendment as ensuring that the federal government did not destroy state sovereignty. See
id.
38. See Taylor v. Dep't of Fish and Game, 523 F. Supp. 514 (D. Mont 1981) and
Campbell v. Connelie, 542 F Supp. 275 (N.D.N.Y. 1982).
39. See Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 238.
40. See id. at 243.
41. See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 637.
42. See id. The Eleventh Amendment states: "The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of
any foreign state." U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
43. See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 640 (citing Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct
1114 (1996)).




The Eleventh Amendment is limited by the provisions of the
subsequently adopted Fourteenth Amendment.46 In the Court's view,
the ADEA is not appropriate legislation under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.47 The Court previously ruled that age
classifications do not trigger strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because age,
unlike race, is not a suspect classification.48 As long as an age
distinction by a state is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest, the state does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 49
The ADEA cannot be justified under the power given to Congress
to prevent unconstitutional behavior under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment because the Act's provisions go far beyond
what is required by the Constitution. ° The Court characterized its
extension to the states as "an unwarranted response to a perhaps
inconsequential problem." 1 In the Court's view, Congress had
almost no basis to conclude that states and local governments were
discriminating against workers in an unconstitutional manner.
5 2
After concluding that the ADEA was not justified by congressional
powers deriving from section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court pointed out that in almost every state employees can recover
damages from their states under state age discrimination statutes.5
The Kimel decision affects a significant part of the workforce in
the United States. About 15.5 million people work for state and
local governments.5 In some states age discrimination statutes are
modeled on the ADEA,55 but in others there are significant
differences between the state laws and the ADEA that will make it
more difficult for age discrimination plaintiffs to recover damages.
46. See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 644.
47. See id. at 645.
48. See id. at 646.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 647.
51. See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 648-49.
52. See id. at 649.
53. See id. at 650.
54. See ARHCIBALD Cox ET AL, LABOR LAw 94 (12th ed. 1996).
55. See Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358 (2d Cir. 1999). The court noted that since
claims under the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y EXEC. LAW § 296 (NYSHRL), "are
analyzed identically to claims under the ADEA and Title VII, the outcome of an employment
discrimination claim made pursuant to the NYSHRL is the same as it is under the ADEA and
Title VII." Id. at 363 n.1. The Massachusetts age discrimination law, MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch.
151B, § 4(1B), is "substantially identical" to the ADEA. See Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F3d
696, 705-06 (1st Cir. 1999). California's age discrimination law also parallels the ADEA and
the courts of that state look to federal decisions involving the ADEA when interpreting the
state statute. See Marks v. Loral Corp., 57 Cal. App. 4th 30, 51 (1997).
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Since state employees can no longer sue under the ADEA, Kimel
makes state age discrimination laws more important and curtails
the role of the ADEA.
II. THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN ADEA CASES: REEVES V. SANDERSON
PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC
The Supreme Court also recently decided Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc.,-6 another case with important
implications for ADEA claims. In Reeves the employer appealed the
trial court's refusal to grant it a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.57 The Fifth Circuit reversed the trial
court, holding that Reeves had not presented enough evidence to
support the jury's finding of illegal discrimination.58 The employer
argued that Reeves was fired because he failed to maintain
adequate records.59 Reeves introduced evidence to show this
explanation was a pretext for age discrimination, including
evidence that he did maintain accurate records and that a key
company official "demonstrated age-based animus" toward him.60
The Fifth Circuit stated that while Reeves may have presented
enough evidence to show that the employer's explanation was a
pretext, the evidence was insufficient to show that his firing was
related to his age.6' The court noted that the company official's
ageist comments were not made in the context of his firing, that
some individuals who recommended Reeves be fired were also over
the age of fifty, and that two younger supervisors, one in his
thirties and one age forty-five, had been charged with the same
offense.62
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split
over whether a plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination, along
with enough evidence to convince a reasonable fact finder to reject
the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation, could support a
finding of intentional discrimination.63 The court answered this
question affirmatively and held that the Fifth Circuit had
misinterpreted the evidentiary burden on plaintiffs attempting to
56. 2000 WL 743663 (U.S. June 12, 2000).
57. See Reeves, 2000 WL 743663 at *4.
58. See id.
59. See id. at *3.
60. See id.
61. See id. at *4.




prove intentional age discrimination using circumstantial evidence.64
The Court noted that the Fifth Circuit, like several other circuits,
applied the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green framework,
developed in the context of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
to analyze ADEA cases based on circumstantial evidence. 65 The
Court withheld judgment as to whether it is proper to use the
McDonnell Douglas analysis in ADEA cases, but assumed it is
because the issue had not been raised by the parties.6 Under that
framework a plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case
67 of
discrimination.6 Reeves had done this by showing that he was a
member of the class protected by the ADEA, that he was qualified
for his position, that he was fired by the defendant, and that his
position was then filled by a younger worker.6 9 After the prima
facie case was established, the burden shifted to the defendant to
produce evidence that the action was taken for a nondiscriminatory
reason.70 The defendant had produced evidence sufficient to lead
the trier of fact to conclude that Reeves was fired for failure to
maintain accurate records.7' At that point, the Court said, "the
McDonnell Douglas framework - with its presumptions and
burdens - disappeared." 72 The only remaining issue was whether
the employer had acted with a discriminatory motive.73 The
plaintiff, as Reeves did, can then attempt to show that the
employer's explanation is a pretext for discrimination.74 Though the
presumption of discrimination established by the prima facie case
disappears when the defendant offers evidence of a
64. See id. at *8.
65. See id. at *5. This approach, described in the text below, was developed in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
66. See Reeves, 2000 WL 743663 at *5.
67. "Prima facie" means "[alt first site; on the first appearance . . . presumably." A
"prima facie case" is one "such as will prevail until contradicted and overcome by other
evidence." BLACK's LAw DIcTIoNARY 1189 (6th ed. 1990).
68. See Reeves, 2000 WL 743663 at *5.
69. See id. After Reeves was fired, his job was filled by three different individuals, all
in their thirties. Id. Although his replacements were outside of the class protected by the
ADEA, the court had ruled in O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996),
that it is not necessary for replacements to be younger than forty, only younger than the
plaintiff. See id. at 312-13.
70. See Reeves, 2000 WL 743663 at *5. The court stated that the defendant bears only
the burden of production at this stage, and never bears the burden of persuasion. Id. (citing
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993)).
71. See id.
72. See id. (quoting St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 510).
73. See Reeves, 2000 WL 743663 at *5.
74. See id. at *6.
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nondiscriminatory explanation, evidence presented as part of the
prima facie case can still be considered in determining whether
that explanation is a pretext for discrimination. 5
The court of appeals erred in disregarding evidence presented as
part of the plaintiffs prima facie case when attempting to
determine whether he had presented enough evidence to prove that
age discrimination motivated the employer's decision.76 It also
discounted the value of evidence showing that the employer's
explanation was pretextual 7 Proof that the employer's explanation
is pretextual can serve as circumstantial evidence of intentional age
discrimination, and, as the court noted, "it may be quite
persuasive." 8 If an employer's explanation is found to be pretext,
discrimination could be the most likely alternative explanation and
the pretext might be seen as an attempt to cover up the illegal
discrimination.79 Although the fact finder's rejection of the
employer's proffered nondiscriminatory motives does not result in
judgment for the plaintiff, 0 the trier of fact is permitted to infer the
existence of illegal discrimination from the fact that a false
explanation was offered.8' The Fifth Circuit was wrong in
concluding that a plaintiff must always produce "additional,
independent evidence of discrimination."8 2
The decision in Reeves eases the burden on ADEA plaintiffs
attempting to prove their cases with indirect or circumstantial
evidence. Because it is difficult to obtain direct evidence of an
employer's motives, many ADEA cases rely on circumstantial
evidence. The Reeves decision makes it easier for plaintiffs in that
situation to survive summary judgment. The Court's reasoning that
a false explanation can serve as good evidence of a discriminatory
motive is sound, and this case will strengthen the role of the ADEA
in protecting older workers.
III. DISPARATE IMPACT AND THE ADEA
Discrimination cases have typically been proven in one of two
ways: by proving intentional disparate treatment with either direct
75. See id.
76. See id. at *8.
77. See id.
78. See Reeves, 2000 WL 743663 at *9.
79. See id.
80. See St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 511.
81. See Reeves, 2000 WL 743663 at *9.
82. See id. at *10.
2001
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or indirect evidence as in Reeves, or by showing the disparate
impact of a seemingly nondiscriminatory practice or decision on a
protected class.83 Some circuits have allowed plaintiffs to recover
under the ADEA using only proof of disparate impact while other
circuits have not allowed it.8M The issue has not been clearly
resolved by the Supreme Court.8 5 Even though the Supreme Court
did not rule on the issue, some courts have interpreted Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins86 to prohibit recovery under the ADEA based
on disparate impact.87  Other courts have interpreted Hazen
differently and continue to allow ADEA claims based on evidence
of disparate impact.88
The disparate impact theory of discrimination originated in a
1971 case involving Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Griggs
v. Duke Power Co.89 The disparate impact approach can be used to
challenge "practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation."9° A plaintiff is not required to prove discriminatory
intent, but, rather, must establish a prima facie case of disparate
impact by showing that a facially neutral employment practice has
an adverse impact on the plaintiff as a member of a protected
class.9' Statistics can be used to show adverse impact on a
protected group.92 The employer is then entitled to offer a business
explanation that the plaintiff can challenge as pretext.9 3 Although
the employer has the burden of producing evidence showing a
business justification, the burden of persuasion is always borne by
the plaintiff.94
Congress amended the Civil Rights Act in 1991 to include
83. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993).
84. See Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 700-01 (lst Cir. 1999).
85. See Hazen, 507 U.S. at 609-10.
86. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
87. See MuUin, 164 F.3d at 700-01.
88. See Camacho v. Sears Roebuck, 939 F Supp 113, 121 (D.P.R. 1996).
89. 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971).
90. See Griggs, 91 S. Ct. at 853.
91. See Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 364 (2nd Cir. 1999).
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989). Before Wards
Cove, employers were required to show a compelling need for the employment practice
producing the disparate impact and that no other alternatives were available. See Kirby v.
Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 705 n.6 (8th Cir. 1980). Wards Cove decreased the burden
on the employer. Houghton v. SIPCO, Inc., 38 F.3d 953, 958 (8th Cir. 1994). The Eight Circuit
noted in a 1999 case that the 1991 Civil Rights Act overturned Wards Cove in relation to Title
VII, but that circuit has never decided whether this affected the applicability of Wards Cove
to the ADEA. See Allen v. Entergy Corp., 193 F3d 1010, 1015 (8th Cir. 1999).
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disparate impact liability in the text of the statute, but has not
done this with the ADEA.9 5 The Supreme Court noted in Hazen that
it had never decided whether liability under the ADEA could rest
on evidence of disparate impact and declined to decide the issue in
that case 6 While the text of the ADEA does not explicitly mandate
disparate impact liability, neither does it rule it out.97 The same
situation existed with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 until
it was amended in 1991, and disparate impact claims were
permitted under that statute by the Supreme Court twenty years
before Congress added clear references to disparate impact in the
text of the statute 8 Because the ADEA was modeled after the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the language of both statutes is highly similar
and the Supreme Court has interpreted the two in a similar way.9
In 1980 the Second Circuit ruled in GeUer v. Markham'0° that an
ADEA plaintiff could base a claim on the disparate impact theory. 10 1
The Court disagreed with the defendant's argument against allowing
such a claim, quoting an earlier Supreme Court decision in which
the court stated that "the substantive prohibitions of the ADEA
were derived in haec verba'012 from Title VII." 103 Although the court
recognized that there are procedural differences between Title VII
and the ADEA, it believed that disparate impact claims are
appropriate under the ADEA because its text is similar to the
language found in Title VII that the Supreme Court construed to
allow disparate impact claims in Griggs.1°4
The Supreme Court denied certiorari. 0 5 Justice Rehnquist
dissented from the denial of certiorari, disagreeing that the hiring
of less experienced teachers for financial reasons and the refusal to
hire more experienced teachers who happened to be older violated
the ADEA. 1 6 Rehnquist criticized the court of appeals for rejecting
95. See Camacho, 939 F. Supp. at 120. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (c)(1)(a) (1994).
96. See Camacho, 939 E Supp. at 120.
97. See id. at 120.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. 635 F.2d 1027 (2nd Cir. 1980).
101. GeUer, 635 F.2d at 1031.
102. "In haec verba" means "[i]n these words; in the same words." BLACK'S LAW
DICnoNARY 782 (6th ed. 1990).
103. See GeUer, 635 F.2d at 1032. The court quoted this language from LoriUard v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978).
104. See id.
105. See Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
106. See id. at 2029.
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the employer's cost justification for its policy.'0 7 Because the ADEA
states that it is not unlawful to make decisions based on
reasonable factors other than age, 08 he did not believe that
Congress had intended for the ADEA "to have the restraining
influence on local governments" that the Second Circuit's decision
would have. 10 9 Justice Rehnquist also made the point that the
Supreme Court had never held that an ADEA violation can be
proven by evidence of disparate impact,"' a situation that still
exists today.
After Geller v. Markham several other circuits followed the lead
of the Second Circuit by allowing ADEA disparate impact claims."'
This trend changed after the Supreme Court decided Hazen Paper
Co. v. Biggins"' in 1993. Hazen did not involve a disparate impact
claim, but, rather, the question of whether interference with the
vesting of an employee's pension violated the ADEA, as well as a
question about damages.
1 3
The plaintiff in Hazen made only an allegation of disparate
treatment, and did not make a claim based on disparate impact."
14
Despite the nature of the case as a disparate treatment case,
statements made in the majority opinion by Justice O'Connor have
led some circuits to rule that ADEA violations cannot be
established by evidence of disparate impact alone." 5 Justice
O'Connor defined and discussed both the disparate treatment and
the disparate impact theories of discrimination" 6 before saying "we
have never decided whether a disparate impact theory of liability is
available under the ADEA ... and we need not do so here." " 7She
then stated her view that "[d]isparate treatment . . . captures the
essence of what Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA."" ' s In the
107. See id.
108. 29 U.S.C. 623(0(1) (1998).
109. See Markham, 451 U.S. at 948-49.
110. See id. at 948.
111. See Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983); Lowe v.
Commack Union Free Sch., 886 E2d 1364 (2nd Cir. 1989); Abbot v. Federal Forge, Inc., 912
F.2d 867, 872 (6th Cir. 1990); Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F2d 1417, 1423-25 (9th Cir.
1990).
112. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
113. See Hazen, 507 U.S. at 608.
114. See id. at 609.
115. See Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F3d 696, 700 (1st Cir. 1999).
116. See id.
117. See Hazen, 507 U.S. at 610. Justice O'Connor cited Rehnquist's dissent from
Markham v. Geller Id.
118. See Hazen, 507 U.S. at 610.
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Court's view, the ADEA was aimed at age-based stereotypes and
was meant to prohibit the use of age as a proxy for factors such as
productivity.119 When decisions are based on factors other than age,
inaccurate age stereotyping is not a problem, even if the basis for
the decision can be correlated with age. 120 The Court held that an
employer does not violate the ADEA by making a decision that
interferes with an older worker's pension benefits that would have
vested due to years of service.
12'
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, wrote that the majority opinion
should not be construed to incorporate the disparate impact theory
into the ADEA.122 The concurrence reiterated the fact that the
Supreme Court has not yet decided that issue and added "there are
substantial arguments that it is improper to carry over disparate
impact analysis from Title VII to the ADEA."1
The Seventh Circuit was the first circuit after the Hazen decision
to rule that the ADEA does not allow disparate impact claims in
EEOC v. Francis Parker School. 24 The court discussed Hazen,
noting that it was only a disparate treatment case, but found its
analysis to be helpful in determining whether disparate impact
claims should be allowed under the ADEA. 25 The court read Hazen
to define the purpose of the ADEA as prohibiting decisions rooted
in stereotypes about age, but not to prohibit decisions based on
factors "which merely tend to affect" older workers adversely.
126
The court interpreted the reasonable factors other than age
exception in § 623(f) of the ADEA to suggest that decisions made
for non-age related reasons that happen to be correlated with age
could not serve as the basis for an ADEA claim. 2 The court noted
that a similar provision in the Equal Pay Act 28 had been interpreted
to prohibit disparate impact claims. 29 The majority rejected Title
VII precedents used by a dissenting member to make a case for
119. See id. at 611.
120. See id.
121. See id. Justice O'Connor noted that firing an employee to prevent the vesting of a
pension is actionable under ERISA. Id. She also noted that making decisions using pension
status as a proxy for age would violate the ADEA. Id.
122. See Hazen, 507 U.S. at 618.
123. See id.
124. 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994).
125. See Francis Parker Sch., 41 E3d at 1076.
126. See id. at 1077.
127. See id.
128. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1994).
129. See id. (citing County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170-71 (1981)).
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ADEA disparate impact claims.130
In Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc.,13' the Tenth Circuit also ruled
that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the ADEA.
3 2
The court read the clause prohibiting discrimination "because of
such individual's age" as limiting ADEA liability to intentional
discrimination."' Despite its practice of usually interpreting the
ADEA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "in tandem" and
the fact that Title VII contained similar language when the Supreme
Court developed the disparate impact theory in Griggs, the court
found disparate impact an inappropriate theory under the ADEA,
citing differences in the texts of the statutes as well as differing
congressional objectives.'3 The court viewed the statute's exception
for decisions based on reasonable factors other than age to be
another reason not to allow ADEA disparate impact claims, also
noting the Supreme Court's refusal to allow disparate impact claims
under the similarly worded Equal Pay Act.
135
A number of other factors played a role in the court's decision,
including its interpretation of Hazen, the ADEAs legislative history,
and the fact that Congress had amended Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to include disparate impact but had not done so
with the ADEA. 136 The court expressed concern about potential
"practical problems," saying that setting up age categories for the
purpose of showing disparate impact can be "imprecise" and,
therefore, subject to manipulation to magnify or diminish the
impact on the protected class. 37 The opinion also noted a trend
toward not allowing disparate impact claims under the ADEA
among other circuit courts, although only one of the three
decisions it cited actually reached this conclusion.138 A subsequent
130. See Francis Parker Sch., 41 F3d at 1077.
131. 73 F3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996).
132. See Ellis, 73 F3d at 1007.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id. The Equal Pay Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1994).
136. See Ellis, 73 F3d at 1007-08.
137. See id. at 1009.
138. The court cited DiBiase v. Smith Kline Beecham Corp., 48 F3d 719, 732-34 (3d
Cir. 1995); Lyon v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n Profl Staff Union, 53 E3d 135 (6th Cir. 1995); and
Francis Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994). The court mischaracterized the holdings in
Lyon and DiBiase. In DiBiase only one of the three judges on the Third Circuit panel found
it necessary to decide whether the ADEA allows for disparate impact claims. DiBiase, 48
E3d 731. Judge Greenberg wrote for himself alone, not the majority, when he stated "it is
difficult to see how disparate impact liability can survive the analysis (in Hazen)." Id. at 733.
He believed the text of the ADEA as well as the differences between the policies behind the
ADEA and Title VII were factors against allowing ADEA disparate impact claims. Id. at
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Tenth Circuit case, Furr v. Seagate Technology,139 followed the rule
set down in Ellis by not allowing disparate impact claims under the
ADEA. 140 The court concluded that disparate impact may be the
innocent result of acting on "reasonable factors other than age."
141
The court held that making business decisions using a subjective
standard, such as potential, that was correlated with age did not
violate the ADEA in light of Hazen.
141
In 1999 the First Circuit also concluded that disparate impact
claims are not appropriate under the ADEA in Mullin v. Ratheon.'"
The court began its analysis by examining the statutory language.'"
Citing Ellis, the court indicated its agreement with the argument
that the language of the ADEA refers to intentional discrimination,
although it admitted that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains
parallel language. 145 To support its view that the ADEA prohibits
only intentional age discrimination, the court quoted Justice
O'Connor's statement in Hazen that "disparate treatment
captures the essence of what Congress sought to prohibit in the
ADEA- 11
46
The First Circuit distinguished the disparate impact claims
allowed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Griggs by
making a distinction between racial discrimination and age
discrimination. 147 While the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was intended to
remedy past racial discrimination, the First Circuit viewed the
ADEA as being aimed at contemporaneous age stereotyping rather
than past discriminatory practices. 4 The court noted that other
733-34. However, the judge concluded by saying he was writing only to express his doubt
about the issue and stated, "I need not go so far as to say that disparate impact theory is
never available under the ADEA" Id. at 734. Likewise, in Lyon the Sixth Circuit did not hold
that the ADEA does not allow disparate impact claims. Although the Lyon court stated there
is "considerable doubt as to whether a claim of age discrimination may exist under a
disparate-impact theory," it went on to cite a Sixth Circuit precedent allowing ADEA
disparate impact claims. See Abbot v. Federal Forge, 912 E2d 867 (6th Cir. 1990); Lyon, 53
F.3d at 139. The plaintiffs in Lyon conceded that the case was not a disparate impact case.
Lyon, 53 F.3d at 137. The primary issue was whether the plaintiffs had "stated a claim for
disparate-treatment discrimination." Id.
139. 82 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 1996).
140. See FIurr, 82 F3d at 987.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. 164 F.3d 696 (lst Cir. 1999).
144. See id. at 700.
145. See id.
146. See id. (quoting Hazen, 507 U.S. at 610).
147. See id. at 701.
148. See Mullin, 164 F.3d at 701.
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circuits had reached the same conclusion about the invalidity of
the disparate impact approach under the ADEA. 149 Like the Tenth
Circuit in Ellis, the court also saw the "reasonable factors other
than age" exception, the legislative history of the ADEA, and the
failure of Congress to amend the ADEA to permit disparate impact
claims as factors supporting its conclusion. 15°
Unlike the First, Seventh and Tenth Circuits, the Eighth Circuit in
1996 reaffirmed its view that ADEA claims based on disparate
impact should be allowed in Smith v. City of Des Moines.151 The
court noted it had declined to read Hazen as prohibiting disparate
impact claims in Houghton v. SIPCO, Inc., 52 an earlier case
decided after Hazen.''
In a 1999 case, EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,5 4 the Eighth
Circuit limited the availability of the theory somewhat by ruling
that disparate impact claims by subgroups cannot be recognized
under the ADEA. 155 The EEOC did not claim that the reduction in
force involved in the case had a disparate impact on the entire
class of workers over age forty, but rather that the disparate
impact fell on a subgroup of workers protected by the ADEA -
those aged fifty-five and older. 56 The court rejected this attempt to
bring a subgroup ADEA claim, stating that allowing such claims
could result in ADEA violations even in cases where the
employment practice at issue had a beneficial effect on workers
forty and older as a whole. 57
149. See id. (citing Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996); Lyon v.
Ohio Educ. Ass'n Prof'l Staff Union, 53 E3d 135 (6th Cir. 1995); and EEOC v. Francis Parker
Sch., 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994)). However, as the Ellis court did, the First Circuit
mischaraterized the holding in Lyon. The Sixth Circuit in that case did not hold that the
ADEA does not allow disparate impact claims. Although the Lyon court stated there is
"considerable doubt as to whether a claim of age discrimination may exist under a
disparate-impact theory," it went on to cite a Sixth Circuit precedent allowing ADEA
disparate impact claims. See Abbot v. Federal Forge, 912 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1990), Lyon, 53
E3d at 139. The plaintiffs in Lyon conceded that the case was not a disparate impact case.
Lyon, 53 E3d at 137. The primary issue was whether the plaintiffs had "stated a claim for
disparate-treatment discrimination." Id.
150. See Mullin, 164 E3d at 702-03.
151. 99 F3d 1466 (8th Cir. 1996).
152. 38 F3d 953 (8th Cir. 1994). In Houghton v. SIPCO, Inc., the court cited Hazen but
did not discuss its view of the impact of Hazen on ADEA disparate impact claims. Id. at 957,
960.
153. See Smith v. City of Des Moines, 164 F3d at 1470.
154. 191 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 1999).
155. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d at 950-51.
156. See id. at 950.
157. See id. at 951. However, the court expressed its disapproval of the argument that
subgroup disparate impact claims should be disallowed because allowing them would lead to
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The EEOC admitted in McDonnell Douglas that the employer had
based its decision on factors such as retirement eligibility, salary
and seniority.64 The court stated that employment decisions
motivated by such factors do not violate the ADEA, even when the
results correlate with age.159 The Eighth Circuit concluded its
disparate impact discussion by saying that it did not believe
Congress intended to impose ADEA liability on employers making
decisions based on factors other than age just because a subgroup
experienced a disparate impact.' 60 Later in 1999, in Allen v. Entergy
Corp.,161 the Eighth Circuit noted that although it had continued to
recognize ADEA disparate impact claims, it had not "expressly
analyzed" the issue since Hazen had been decided.' 62
In 1999 the Second Circuit also reaffirmed its approval of the
disparate impact approach in ADEA cases in Smith v. Xerox
Corp.163 Although the circuit had allowed disparate impact claims in
previous post-Hazen cases, it had done so without discussion of
Hazen in its analysis. 6 4 The Smith court distinguished Hazen,
stating that it did not need to determine the extent to which Hazen
limits disparate impact claims because, unlike Hazen, the
defendant in Smith did not claim to have relied upon permissible
factors that happened to be correlated with age. 65 The court cited
and followed its pre-Hazen conclusion in Geller v. Markham'6 6 that
disparate impact liability should be recognized under the ADEA, as
it was under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Griggs.
67
In 1995 the Ninth Circuit in Mangold v. California Public
Utilities Commission'4 noted that its existing pre-Hazen precedent
more lawsuits. Id.
158. See id.
159. See id. The court cited Hazen on this point. Id.
160. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 191 F3d at 951.
161. 193 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 1999).
162. See Allen, 193 F3d at 1014. The court noted that the court in Smith had relied on
two pre-Hazen cases as well as Houghton. Id. The jury verdict in Houghton was reached a
year before Hazen was decided and the appeals court in Houghton did not discuss the
analysis used in Hazen. Id.
163. 196 F.3d 358 (2nd Cir. 1999).
164. See id. at 367 n.6. See AFSCME v. New York City Dep't of Parks and Recreation,
113 F3d 347 (2nd Cir. 1997). In that case the court noted that the Supreme Court had not
decided the issue of whether disparate impact claims can be made under the ADEA in
Hazen, but did not discuss Hazen. See id. at 350.
165. See Smith, 196 F3d at 367.
166. 635 F.2d 1027 (2nd Cir 1980).
167. See Smith, 196 F3d at 367.
168. 67 F.3d 1470 (9th Cir. 1995).
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supported a disparate impact cause of action under the ADEA.'6
However, the court determined it was not necessary to decide the
issue of whether such claims were valid after Hazen because the
jury had found disparate treatment, not disparate impact. 170 The
court did reach the issue in 1999 in Arnett v. California Public
Employees Retirement System'17 and reaffirmed its earlier view,
stating "[w]e perceive no conflict between Hazen and our decision
in this case . . . . [I]n this circuit a plaintiff may challenge age
discrimination under a disparate impact analysis .... -"72
Arnett was reversed by the Supreme Court, not on the disparate
impact issue, but on the basis of Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents.'73 As discussed, supra, following Kimel, state employees
are unable to sue their states under the ADEk'74 The Supreme
Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Ninth
Circuit.175 In 2000, in Frank v. United Airlines, Inc.,176 the Ninth
Circuit reaffirmed its reasoning in Arnett and concluded the ADEA
does allow for disparate impact claims.
177
Several other circuits have not yet decided the issue. In
Thrlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 78 the Eleventh Circuit, while
stating that it was not necessary to reach the issue, noted that
"neither this court nor the Supreme Court expressly has allowed
disparate impact claims under the ADEA."' 79 The D.C. Circuit also
has not decided the issue, although in Kroger v. Reno'80 it assumed
for the purpose of deciding that case only that disparate impact
claims could be made under the ADEA.'5 ' The issue was not
reached because the plaintiff's evidence was not sufficient to
169. See Mangold, 67 F3d 1474.
170. See id. The court cited Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417 (9th Ci. 1990).
171. 179 E3d 690 (9th Cir. 1999).
172. See Local 350, 998 F2d 648.
173. See California Pub. Employees Retirement Sys. v. Arnett, 120 S. Ct. 930 (2000).
Because the state had not raised the issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity at trial or in its
appellate briefs, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court. Arnett v. California
Pub. Employees' Sys., 207 E3d 565 (9th Cir. 2000).
174. See Arnett, 207 F.3d 565.
175. See Arnett, 120 S. Ct. at 930.
176. 2000 WL 791209 (9th Cir. 2000).
177. See Frank, 2000 WL 791209 *10. The court said, "[wie see no reason to depart
from our conclusion in Arnett and we again hold that a disparate impact claim is cognizable
under the ADEA." Id.
178. 135 E3d 1428 (11th Cir. 1998).
179. See Thrlington, 135 F3d at 1437. The plaintiff had presented only evidence of
disparate treatment. Id.
180. 98 F.3d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
181. See Kroger, 98 F3d at 639.
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establish a prima facie case of disparate impact.8 2
The intercircuit split on the issue of whether disparate impact
claims should be recognized under the ADEA is a significant one.
Its resolution has the potential to increase or reduce the number of
successful ADEA claims. The ability to use a disparate impact
theory as a basis for ADEA claims is important to plaintiffs who
have difficulty obtaining direct or even circumstantial evidence of
age discrimination. However, given the tone of Hazen, and
particularly the concurring opinion, it seems likely that the current
Supreme Court will eventually resolve the circuit split by
prohibiting ADEA claims based solely on disparate impact
evidence. Proof of disparate impact on older workers would still be
useful as additional evidence of age discrimination for plaintiffs
with enough evidence of intentional age discrimination to sustain
ADEA claims.
CONCLUSION
In some cases in the past twenty years the Supreme Court issued
decisions that strengthened the ADEA. It did this in Western
Airlines v. Criswell when it confirmed the view that the BFOQ
exception to the ADEA should be interpreted narrowly. It did so
again this year in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products when it
eased the burden on plaintiffs attempting to prove their disparate
treatment cases with circumstantial evidence. On the whole,
however, recent cases and trends have tended to limit the
applicability of the ADEA.
The decision in Kimel and the trend against allowing ADEA
claims based solely on disparate impact evidence have limited the
role of the ADEA. Kimel was decided on constitutional grounds
and did not turn on the text of the ADEA itself, and is consistent
with recent Supreme Court cases emphasizing the role of the states
in our federal system. As discussed, supra, in many cases state age
discrimination laws mirror the ADEA. Any state government that
weakens age discrimination laws or engages in wide spread age
discrimination would risk alienating a sizeable block of older
voters. While the impact of the Kimel decision remains to be seen,
there is at least the potential that it will not greatly alter the
substantive rights of older workers affected by it, but merely shift
the appropriate forum for relief.




evidence of disparate impact is not based on constitutional
grounds, but on a changing interpretation of the ADEA itself that is
broader than the disparate impact issue. Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins is an important example of a less expansive reading of the
ADEA's prohibitions, due in part to the Court's interpretations of
the "reasonable factors other than age" exception to the ADEA. An
employer can make decisions based on factors that are correlated
with age without violating the ADEA's prohibition against disparate
treatment, and, in a number of circuits, will never be liable under
the ADEA if a plaintiff can only produce evidence of disparate
impact on older workers.
Sophisticated employers desiring a younger workforce have a
wide range of permissible factors available to weed out older
workers. Yet, with fewer younger workers available in coming
decades due to the demographic shift toward an older population,
companies will need to rely on older workers in a way that was
not the case in previous decades. While this is not a guarantee that
employers will not discriminate against older workers, it would
seem to make it less likely. Nevertheless, Congress should act to
clarify the issue of whether disparate impact claims should be
allowed under the ADEA, and also the extent to which the
"reasonable factors other than age" exception allows disparate
treatment based on factors closely correlated with age.
The ADEA will continue to play a vital role in protecting the
rights of older workers. No workers should be immune from
discipline or firing merely because they are over the age of forty.
However, courts should interpret and enforce the ADEA in a way
that ensures that workers are evaluated on the basis of their
individual abilities and performance, not age-based stereotypes.
David E. Mitchell
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